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with a view toward reciprocal maximization of
egoistic self-interest. Since non-human ani
mals
can neither assert
self-interested
claims as "rights" nor force from human
beings the recognition of them by virtue of
the power to infringe on corresponding human

Trans-Species Unlimited
In his article "Animal Rights," [lJ Jan
Narveson presents an alternative
"rroral"
theory to what he calls the "Singer-Regan
position."
This theory--"rational egoism"-
\\Quld exclude non-human animals from rroral
consideration and deny them all rights.
His
excuse for developing this "nasty doctrine"
is that he is "not convinced that they [Sing
er and Regan] are right" and that "there is
much to be learned from doing so."
Regan
replies to this argument in his article "Nar
veson on Egoism and the Rights of Ani
rrals, "[ 2] and now Dale Jamieson has entered
the debate with his "Rational Egoism and
Animal Rights," [3] a critique both of Narve
son's position and of Regan's rebuttal.

"rights," non-human animals have no rights.
We human beings are, therefore, ''norally''
entitled to abuse animals in any way we see
fit so long as such treatment does not in
fringe on our own self-interest (as it might,
for example, if we beat an expensive riding
horse to death).
Narveson proceeds to consider the case
of rrorons and children as the basis of a
possible objection to his theory.
Children
who are very young \\Quld seem to lack the
capacity to assert self-interested claims,
and alrrost all of them certainly lack the
coercive power to get these claims recognized
as "rights." Similarly, depending on their
degree of debilitation, rrorons cannot assert
claims, and though many may have the coercive
power to infringe on others' "rights," they
are not likely to realize that the guarantee
of the recognition of their own claims as
"rights" depends on not infringing on others'
corresponding "rights." A "rational" egoist
will, thus, have no "rational" basis for
respecting the "rights" of rrorons, since the
rrorons will probably not respect him/her •
Narveson's implicit conclusion, therefore, is
that children and rrorons, like non-human
animals, have no rights. But is this a tell
ing objection to the theory of rational ego
ism?
Only i f children's and rroron' s lack of
rights in scme way results in the diminish
ment of other rational egoists' self-inter
ests.

Neither of these rejoinders to Narve
son's argument is very effective.
Both ig
nore its principal weakness and are thorough
ly speciesist, leaving open the possibility
of justifying the continued abuse of anirrals.
In the present paper, [4] I try to explicate
the principal flaw in Narveson's position
(section one), show the inadequacy of Regan's
and Jamieson's replies (section t\\Q) , and
suggest the basis for a rrore cogent critique
of "rational egoism" (section three). In the
final section of the paper, I argue that
analysis of these articles reveals the danger
of enervation faced by any liberation move
ment when its issues becxxne the focus of
debate within an academic context.

i
Narveson's argument. is briefly as fol
lows:
the foundation of rrorality is not, as
Singer and Regan \\Quld have it, the recog
nition that all anirrals have the right to
equal treatment in cases in which they would.
suffer evil as a result of being denied it.
On the contrary, rights are based solely upon
mutual agreement between "rational" agents
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According to Narveson, a rational egoist
will treat children ~ though they
had
rights, because the self-interests of ration
ally egoistic parents include the self-inter
ests of their children (rroronic or other
wise).
Since they want their own children
protected, they will respect other people's
children as well.
Moreover, according to
Narveson, a rational egoist has "nothing to
gain from being permitted to invade the chil
dren of others" (a highly questionable as
sumption, as witness child migrant laborers).
But what about orffums? Since these children
have no parents, their abuse would not seem
to diminish other rational egoists' self-

Peculiarly enough, however, the objec
tion to rational egoism as fonnulated above
does not appear to be the objection which
Narveson tries to counter in his article. He
is not trying to prove that the denial of
rights to children and rrorons does not reduce
other rational egoists' self-interests.
Ra
ther, he seems to be trying to prove that
such a denial of rights need not involve
treatment of children and rrorons which is
different fran that accorded to other hurcan
beings who possess rights, and precisely for
the reason that it is not in the self-inter
est of rational egoists to treat them differ
ently.
That this is the true meaning of
Narveson's response is evident fran the fact
that he refers to this objection as "Singer's
and Regan's argument fran marginal cases. "
Singer's and Regan's point is not that deny
ing children an.d rrorons rights will result in
a diminution of rational egoists' self-inter
ests, and is, therefore, inconsistent with
their position, but that the denial of rights
will lead to abuse of children and rrorons,
which is rrorally wrong.
But a rational ego
ist who is consistent has no reason to share
this concern.
Mistreatment of children and
rrorons can be of no moral concern to a ra
---tional egoist, unless it results in the re
duction of his/her own self-interests.
Such
an objection, in fact, is ccmpletely irrele
vant, for it is based on a moral premise
that it is wrong deliberately to inflict
evil--which the rational egoist explicitly
rejects.
It would seem, however, that Narveson is
inconsistent in his reasoning.
He seems to
share Singer's and Regan's concern, as is
indicated both by the fact that he attempts
to refute the "arguments fran marginal cases"
and by his rejection of cannibalism.
Hte
seems, at one and the same time, to want to
deny that there is any moral ground for
rights except egoistic self-interest, and yet
to protect hurcan beings who possess no rights
fran the abuse which might result fran such a
denial.
The only way in which he can do
this, without exposing himself to the charge
that he provides no justification for prefer
ential treatment of hurcan beings without
rights as canpared to non-hurcan animals, is
to try to show that although children and
morons,
like non-hurcan animals, have no
rights, it is, nonetheless, in the self
interest of rational egoists to treat them
equally. Narveson would say, of course, that
it is not in their self-interest to treat
non-hurcan animals equally.
BE.'IWEEN THE SPEX::IES

interests.
Narveson has an answer which is
applicable to this case, but it is very weak:
we have an interest in the children
of others being properly cared for
because we don't want them growing
up to be criminals or delinquents,
etc.
Prestnnably, this would apply not only to
children with parents but to orphans as well.
It is, however, based on a highly speculative
possibility which is unlikely to be decisive
in determining a rational egoist's calcula
tions of self-interest at any given time.
Moreover, it is obvious that not all forms of
abuse lead to criminal tendencies.
Narveson thinks a rational egoist will
treat (adult) rrorons equally lest he not be
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treated equally were he to beoome a !lOron.
To this "rational" argument, Narveson appends
two "non-rational" bases for equal treatment
of (adult) !lOrons, which would prestmably
also apply to children (!lOrons or otherwise).
The first is that a moron's rational rela
tives may have a "sentimental interest" in
his beirig treated equally.
I.t is unclear in
what sense, if any, this "sentimental inter
est" is a fonn of self-interest.
M::>reover,
as Regan points out in his reply, it seems
obvious that such sentimental interest does
not always exist.
The other factor is "sen
timent-generalization," the htnnan tendency to
extend sympathy to members of one's own race,
species, etc. it seems quite clear that this
is not consistent with egoistic self-inter
est.

idiots are "obscene I!Oral failures"
who
should be exterminated.
Jamieson's position
is that such an alteration in a rational
egoist's concept of his/her own self-interest
would result in his/her fonner self-interest
in favor of idiots being treated fairly being
outweighed, and that the abuse of idiots
would then be mandated by self-interest.
It
is extremely unclear, however, in what sense
the extermination of idiots would serve one's
self-interests.
In what way would the mere
existence of idiots who are seen as "obscene
I!Oral failures" involve a reduction in a
rational egoist's self-interests?
Jamieson also hyp:>thesizes that a popu
lation explosion could result in a view of
hmnan fetuses as a threat to survival and as,
therefore, contrary to one's self-interests.
Were this to happen, we might resort to can
nibalism for the sake of our self-interest.
Anything, of course, is possible, but these
"fables, " as Jamieson rightly calls them,
bear I!Ore resemblance to the idle and rather
paranoid
speculations which underlie the
dcmino theory in politics than to a cogent
retort to rational egoism.

Both Regan and Jamieson reply to Narve
son's argument by trying to show that it is
not necessarily true that the self-interest
of rational egoists will always guarantee
that children and !lOrons, though lacking
rights, will be treated equally.
Regan li
mits himself to the case of idiots, arguing
that is unnecessary, fran the perspective of
rational egoism, to accord equal treatment to
all idiots in order to guarantee protection
for oneself in the event that one became an
idiot.
All that would be necessary is to
guarantee continued equal treatment of all
those who became idiots.
This leaves the
door open to abuse of congenital (adult)
idiots, since such abuse would in no way
violate the rational egoists' self-interest.
Nor will "sentimental interest," as already
pointed out, guarantee equal treabnent of
congenital idiots, since many of them are not
the objects of such interest.

If it could be conclusively proven that
it is not in the self-interest of rational
egoists to treat children and I!Orons as

though they had rights,
this would, of
course, force Narveson to accolUlt for how we
can justify equal treatment in their case and
not in the case of non-htnnan animals. Such a
justification, I believe, could not be pro
vided. Narveson would then be forced (assum
ing that he would not simply adhere dogmatic
ally to an inconsistent position) either to
becane a p.tre rational egoist who would deny
equal treabnent to children and idiots or. to
extend equal treatment to non-htnnan animals
as well.
But in the latter case, the doc
trine of rational egoism will have canpletely
collapsed as an effective guide to "l!Oral n
conduct. In so far as Regan's and Jamieson"s
articles push Narveson toward this Itrlloso
phical dilenroa, they are valuable and worthy
of philosoItrlcal attention.

Jamieson criticizes this second argument
on the grounds that a rational egoist could
respond that the "epistennlogical problems"
involved in detennining who is the object of
sentimental interest are so severe that all
idiots should be included in the "ambit of
I!Orality. "
Quite apart fran the question as
to whether "sentimental interest" is a fonn
of self-interest, this seems to me an ex
tremely quibbling, i f not patently false,
objection to Regan's argument.
Nor are Jamieson's own arguments any
stronger.
He asserts that the concept of
egoistic self-interest is fluid, and that we,
consequently, might cane to the view that

As a defense of animals, however, both
articles suffer fran very severe defects. I.n

(oont. p. 25)
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egoism.
In order to avoid the charge of a
further inconsistency, i.e., the granting of
equal treatment to "rightless" humans but not
to "rightless" non-human animals, he defends
such treatment on the grounds of rational
self-interest.
Yet, his rrotivation, as I
have tried to make clear, is not to avoid
compranising human self-interest by treating
children and idiots differently, but to en
sure their equal treatment without at the
same time compranising the principle of ra
tional egoism.
Nlarveson is inconsistent in"
attempting to prevent the abuse of children
and idiots for non-rationally egoistic rea
sons, but consistent in utilizing rationally
egoistic arguments to prevent such abuse.

the first place, they are effective only to
the extent that Narveson is inconsistent in
his reasoning, i.e., is not a pure rational
egoist.
To a pure rational egoist, both
Regan's and Jamieson's criticisms are com
pletely irrelevant.
Even granted that Narveson is inconsis
tent, Regan's and Jamieson"s arguments are
seriously deficient in other respects.
Not
only do they both ignore many of the weak
nesses
in Narveson's argument for equal
treatment of children and idiots which I have
pointed out above, but their own arguments
(particularly Jamieson's) do not convincingly
establish that it is not in a rational ego
ist's self-interest to treat children and
idiots equally.

His concern for children and idiots,
however, arrounts to an acknowledgement of the
validity of the principle of. equality with
regard to the treatment of human beings.
Consequently, he is open to the charge of
unjustified preferential treatment of human
beings in spite of the fact that he uses
arguments from self-interest to support it.
Egoistic self-interest is not the true ground
for preferential treatment of "rightless"
humans. This is the major weakness in Narve
son's argument, which both Regan and Jamieson
ignore. Narveson is obliged either to become
a pure rational egoist, for whom equal treat
ment of children and idiots is a concern only
insofar as it furthers his self-interests, or
to explain why the principle of equality,
which is applied to "rightless" humans, is
not also applied to non-human animals.

More importantly, the very nature of
their approach to the problem leaves open the
possibility of justifying the continued abuse
of non-human animals. By accepting the issue
on Narveson' s own terms, Regan and Jamieson
grant him the opportunity of trying to pro
duce rrore convincing arguments fran self
interest for the equal treatment of children
and idiots.
Were he successful in doing
this, then the continued abuse of non-human
animals, which does not compranise our self
interest, would be justified.
For in this
case, there would be no contradiction of the
principle of rational egoism in treating
children and idiots--but not non-human ani
mals-as though they had rights.
Whether
this can be done is highly questionable. The
point, however, is that in leaving open this
possibility, Regan's and Jamieson's arguments
are defective in principle.

iv
A profOlmder lesson, however, emerges
from the consideration of these essays, name
ly, a recognition of the dangers to which
liberation rrovements are subject when their
ideological foundations become the topic of
intellectual and scholarly debate within the
academic cammmity.
Aziimal rights advocates
may rightly applaud the increasing interest
of the academic world in the prilosoprical
issues raised by animal rights, but they
should never forget that in terms of the goal
which they espouse--the alleviation of animal
suffering-such interest is justified only to
the extent that it contributes to enlightened.
attitooes toward non-human animals and effec
tive political action on their behalf.
This
is not to say, of course, that they should
simply ignore or reject prilosoprical argu
roonts which run counter to the interests of
non-human animals, nor that they should un

Finally, these arguments are objection
able because they are iiJ.corrigibly species
ist.
This is due, once again, to the fact
that both Regan and JamieSon accept. the pro
blem on Narveson's own terms.
Both priloso
filers argue, in effect, that it is wrong to
abuse animals because it leads to unjustified
abuse of human beings. [5]
iii
What fonn, then, would effective rebut
tal to Narveson's position take? Narveson's
attempt to refute the "argument fran marginal
cases" reveals that he shares singer's and
Regan's concern lest children and idiots be
abused, a concern which is rooted in rroral
assumptions which he supposedly rejects and
which are inconsistent with a pure rational
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than idle curiosity.
Such scholarly efforts
serve only to drain liberation nnvements of
their life-blood, and i f not actually imnor
aI, are at least utterly devoid of all re
deeming lTDral conviction.

=itically accept arguments which sUpp:Jrt
animal rights. But it is essential that they
learn to recognize their enemies.
There is
sanething lTDrally abominable about the "ob
jective" debates on lTDral issues which often
take place in a university context, when a
propelling sense of lTDral outrage is altoge
ther lacking.
A controlled sense of lTDral
outrage is the absolutely indispensable pre
requisite for keeping one's true lTDral goals
in view; it is not equivalent to naive or
dogmatic eITDtional fervor or fanaticism.

'!here may, however, be another lTDtiva
tion for such efforts.
A fundamental error
which often lies at the root of such efforts
is the belief that all legitimate lTDral con
victions are susceptible of absolute rational
justification and that without such justifi
cation they are worthless.
I am convinced,
on the contrary, that there are fundamental
lTDral intuitions which cannot be intellec
tually validated in a definitive way.
When
we become obsessed with intellectual "proofs"
of lTDral p:Jsitions, we are in danger of be
coming deaf to the unequivocal outcry of
lTDral outrage and the testiITDny of our unam
biguous lTDral intuitions.

Where this lTDral outrage is lacking,
there is a serious danger of gratuitous,
destructive scepticism which is often justi
fied on the grounds of intellectual curiosi
ty, but which aITDunts to nothing lTDre than
lTDral capriciousness and intellectual clever
ness.
To such scepticism the same objection
can be made as is rightly made to animal
experimenters who justify the torture of
animals on the grounds that it extends the
sfhere of human knowledge, even where such
knowledge has no relevance whatsoever to the
alleviation of suffering.
This objection is
that compassion must always preempt curiosi
ty.
The extension of human knowledge, where
no reduction of suffering results, may be a
good (although I am inclined to think it
ranks very low on the scale of goods) , but
knowledge gained at the expense of the in
fliction of suffering is, to my mind, quite
clearly an evil.
None of this is to be construed as a
denial of the urgent necessity of providing a
finn, theoretical foundation for the animal
rights nnvement. The attempt to do so neces
sarily involves an unbiased and rigorous
critical assessment not only of opposing
arguments, but also of those which favor
animal rights.
Nor should we dogmatically
assume that opp:Jsing arguments or =itiques
of pro-animal rights arguments are lTDtivated
by speciesism. A fhilosofher who is impelled
by lTDral concern for non-human animals may
render a valuable service by exposing weak
nesses in arguments which are uncritically
accepted.
In a world, however, in which
millions of non-human animals die annually in
factory fanns and experimental laboratories
in the U.S. alone, it is lTDrally repugnant to
see fhilosofhers engaging in gratuitous de
bates on highly technical and pragmatically
irrelevant aspects of the lTDral issue of
animal rights, or sowing the seeds of doubt
concerning the justifiability of human treat
ment of non-human animals for no other reason
BElWEEN THE
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Such intuitions and outrage, of course,.
must always be brought before the court of
reason, and where reason judges sane incoher
ent "'r clearly false, they should be rejec
ted. But the incap:icity of reason to prove a
p:Jsition does not prove it wrong. [6]
The dangers outlined above are lurking
in the articles discussed here, p:irticularly
in those of Narveson and Jamieson.
Let us
recall Narveson's justification for develop
ing his theory of "rational egoism." He does
so, he says, not "because I am convinced that
Singer et. ale are wrong.
I hope it is
because I am not convinced that they are
right."
This looks suspiciously like a ccm
bination of the intellectual curiosity and
26

unbridled faith in reason criticized above.
For it is clear fran his article that Narve
son has a great deal of sympathy for non
human animals.
His sumnary of the "Regan
Singer !=Osition" reads m:>re like a sympathe
tic endorsement of that !=Osition--at least
with regard to the factual abuses perpetrated
on non-human animals--than a neutral, objec
tive des=iption of it. This is sup!=Orted by
other canments scattered throughout the arti
cle, e.g., the rejection of the argument that
factory faun animals are better off for hav
ing been granted the chance to exist, the
reference to rational egoism as a "nasty
doctrine," and so forth.

ment of children and idiots cannot be guaran
teed by considerations of egoistic self
interest, but because the exclusion of non
htnnan animals from ethical consideration is a
m:>ral outrage, which is totally unjustified
if one accepts what I take to be a self
evident m:>ral principle, namely, that the
deliberate infliction of evil is always m:>r
ally wrong.
Notes
1.

2.
Assuming such a concern on Narveson's
part, one might well ask why, i f he is simply
troubled by the ultimate cogency of Singer's
and Regan's !=Osition, he does not address
himself to exposing the weaknesses he finds
in it.
Rather than this, he develops the
"nasty doctrine" of rational egoism, a doc
trine which, as we have seen, he cannot bring
himself to endorse whole-heartedly.
How
could the developnent of a theory which to
tally excludes non-htnnan animals fran IlOral
consideration !=Ossibly be construed as an
effective means of resolving his lingering
doubts concerning the plausibility of Sing
erGs and Regan's !=Osition? It would seem, on
·the contrary, to be a gratuitous exercise in
destructive scepticism, which in no way ser
ves the interest which (I hope) Narveson
shares with Singer and Regan.
1. would sug
gest that the IlOtivation for such an under
taking may well have been the intellectual
curiosity and unbridled faith in reason dis
cussed above.
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(1977), pp. 161-78.

3.
167-71.

Ibid., pp. 179-86.
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4. A small !=Ortion of the present paper
appeared in slightly different form as a
review of Dale Jamieson's article in Ethics &
Animals 2 (1981).

----

5. I am well aware, of course, that
this is not representative of Regan's true
!=Osition, nor, I suspect, of Jamieson's, but
their arguments in these articles are thor
oughly speciesist, nonetheless.
6. I would argue that the opposite is
also true:
the incapacity of reason to dis
prove a !=Osition does not prove it right.-

Jamieson. (and to a much less degree,
Regan) sucCLUTIb in their articles to the same
m:>rally counter-productive temptations. This
is evident fran the fact that they accept
Narveson's forrm.l1ation of the problem as the
starting !=Oint of their criticism.
As a
consequence, they argue their cases in a
thoroughly speciesist way and
canpletely
ignore the principal flaw in Narveson's argu
ment, the exposure of which would be the
primary means of protecting the rights of
animals.
Thus, when Jamieson concludes his
essay by saying that "because it is a bad
m:>ral theory, rational egoism fails to pro
vide a solid basis for a principled indiffer
ence to the sufferings of aninals," he is
certainly correct, but not at all in the way
that he imagines.
Rational egoism is a "bad
m:>ral theory," not because the equal treat
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